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The Russian Stand on the Responsibility to Protect:  
Does Strategic Culture Matter?  
 
Abstract 
Though Russia has approved the doctrine of responsibility to protect in the UN platforms it 
has often been placed rightly in the ‘sceptics group’ of states that are not at ease with the 
premises and practices of R2P. What is the basis of the Russian discontent? This paper suggests 
the relevance of strategic culture in explaining the Russian position on R2P. It is based on the 
assertion that, in addition to humanitarian and moral aspects, responding to mass atrocities 
within the doctrine of R2P takes place in a context of security considerations since, in severe 
cases, it involves, among others, a military component under a UN Security Council mandate. 
As such the use of force, approving, or disapproving it are all related to the realm of security 
even if the motive and objective may be humanitarian. In the security domain, this paper argues 
that Russian strategic culture, in interaction with its national identity, historical experiences, 
and prevailing narratives, forms a loose code of conduct and a context within which strategic 
decisions concerning the use of force in responding to a humanitarian crisis are made. It is, 
thus, concluded that Russian strategic culture by constraining decision-makers, defining 
appropriate behaviour, and reflecting insecurities and aspirations explains Russia’s approach 
to R2P’s normative propositions, legal standing, and implementation in practice. 
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Responsibility to protect, humanitarian intervention, strategic culture, Russian strategic 
culture, Russian foreign policy, norm contestation 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The post-Cold War cases of intervention in humanitarian crises, even if driven by moral 
concerns, were put into a legal cloth by arguing that such crises posed a threat to international 
peace and security. Based on this premise, the UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Somalia, and Haiti authorized the use of force since the situation in the 
respective cases constituted a threat to international peace and security. Similarly, Resolution 
1973, the first and the last case that specifically implemented the coercive element of R2P, 
authorized use of force to protect civilians in Libya referring that the situation on the ground 
threatened international peace and security. 
This linkage established by the Security Council between humanitarian crises and 
maintaining international peace and security bears witness that responding to such crises is not 
only a moral issue but a decision that carries a security dimension. Simply because such 
responses under a UN mandate involve a military component, and they are deemed legally 
justified on the ground to maintain international peace and security by coercive means as 
envisaged in the UN Charter. Yet, the literature on humanitarian intervention and, more 
recently, R2P overlooks security paradigms of states within which decisions about 
humanitarian or R2P based interventions are made. The conditions for the success of a military 
intervention in a humanitarian crisis and possible repercussions of it on the ground in 
explaining states’ involvement or non-involvement in the humanitarian intervention cases have 
been widely discussed (Kuperman, 2013; Paris, 2014). Besides, states’ inclinations to use 
humanitarian intervention to expand their interest or their refrainment from taking part due to 
their calculation of costs and benefits have also been debated (Chandler, 2004; Kurtz & 
Rotmann, 2016). But the relationship between states’ position on how to respond to 
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humanitarian crises and their strategic culture has not been explored. States’ actions or no-
actions in a humanitarian crisis in terms of a military intervention sanctioned by the doctrine 
of R2P is likely to be influenced by their strategic culture since such decisions are not only a 
moral one but also involves a security dimension. In the security realm, the prevailing strategic 
culture constrains decision-makers, defines appropriate behaviour, and reflects insecurities and 
aspirations. Thus, to understand the states’ approach to humanitarian crises that call for military 
intervention within R2P a perspective that brings strategic culture in will shed new light onto 
the debate.  
This paper will pursue this with reference to Russia’s stand on R2P. Russia, though 
approved R2P at its outset in principle and cooperated with the Western world to elevate the 
idea, has gradually come to be sceptical if not oppositional to the doctrine (Bellamy, 2009, p. 
113; Ziegler, 2016a, p. 75). The Russian position has evolved arguing that the adaption of R2P 
as a norm would result in weakening state sovereignty, undermine international order and 
enhance the dominant position of the West with significant damages on Russian national 
interest. The legacy of the Cold War and growing confrontational politics between Russia and 
the West during the Putin era has enhanced the Russian scepticism about Western created 
norms like R2P, and the likelihood of the Western powers cynically using R2P to advance their 
interest often at the expense of Russia. This paper, inspired by constructivist studies in 
international relations, argues for the relevance of Russia’s strategic culture, a thoroughly 
ignored standpoint in the literature, in explaining the critical position of Russia on R2P, a 
concept which is increasingly viewed from a security perspective by the Russian policy makers. 
In this framework, first, I will examine the emergence and evolution of R2P as an 
attempt to construct a new norm conducting humanitarian responsibilities of states. Then, I will 
present Russian strategic culture as a concept that constrains and guides decision-makers 
concerning security related issues including coercive humanitarian policies. In so doing I will 
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explain reluctance of Russia to the expansion of the concept and its usage in international 
politics, particularly by Western powers.  I also will demonstrate that Russia’s stand on R2P is 
instrumental, informed by its perception of threat and opportunities in international relations 
as it is inclined to use a language very akin to R2P in order to justify its interventions in 
Georgia, Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine. I will conclude that Russia’s sense of threat, perception 
of the external world, and positioning vis-à-vis the West while constituting its strategic culture 
have also come to shape its attitude towards the doctrine of R2P.  
 
Responsibility to Protect: Consent and Contestation 
Even though the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was developed in the early 21st 
century to address the prevailing question of mass atrocities brought about by intrastate and 
ethnic conflicts throughout the world in the aftermath of the Cold War, its ideational roots can 
be traced back to just war theory (Prat & Saxon,  2015, pp. 139-140) and its practice to the 19th 
century Europe (Hehir, 2010, p. 26; Weiss & Collins, 1996, p. 17). Influenced by the views 
that while intervention to another ‘civilised state’ is not legitimate, intervention to ‘barbarous 
nations’ with an illiberal government that inflicts violence on its population is justifiable 
(Doyle, 2015, pp. 102-108; Jackson, 1990, p. 185), major European powers claimed a moral 
and political right to intervene in the domestic affairs of other ‘uncivilised’ states` (Ottoman 
Empire in particular) to save strangers (Rodogno, 2012). Hence by the end of the 19th century 
many legal scholars in the West held the view that humanitarian intervention existed in the 
customary international law (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
[ICISS], 2001, p. 17).  
Despite the atrocities and agonies brought by the World War II and the subsequent 
Genocide Convention of 1948, the bi-polar Cold War period that ensued was not a time of 
military interventions justified by humanitarian considerations. This trend shifted 
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unprecedentedly with the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the emergence of the United States 
as the sole hegemon of the world. The end of the Cold War marked not only the removal of 
obstacles (the USSR veto in UN Security Council) before humanitarian interventions but also 
the surge of humanitarian catastrophes throughout the world, from the civil wars in former 
Yugoslavia to genocide in Rwanda. As a result, how to respond to humanitarian crises around 
the world turned up as an important, yet a controversial, issue in the international politics of 
the 1990s (Hehir, 1998, p. 52). 
Regardless of the broad support for the international community to prevent mass 
atrocity crimes like genocides, a sense of scepticism about the real motivation of the Western 
states that intervened in humanitarian crises remained. Distrust became particularly apparent 
with the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, a response to the alleged ethnic cleansing of the 
Albanian population in Kosovo. This unilateral military action that some legal scholars 
described as ‘illegal yet legitimate’ (The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 
2000) was controversial not only because it was a unilateral intervention of NATO without a 
UN Security Council mandate but also the military operations were conducted despite strong 
Russian opposition demonstrating clearly for the first time in the aftermath of the Cold War 
the lack of uniformity in the international arena concerning humanitarian intervention.          
With the NATO intervention to Yugoslavia, the dispute over the legality of 
humanitarian interventions as well as the limits of state sovereignty reached its peak. During 
the height of the discussion, Kofi Annan, the then UN Secretary-General, addressed the 
General Assembly in 2000 asking: ‘If humanitarian interventions are, indeed, an unacceptable 
assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica -to gross and 
systematic violations of human rights that offend every aspect of our common humanity?’ 
(United Nations, 2000).     
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In response to the call of the Secretary-General, the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was formed under the auspices of the Canadian 
government in an attempt to build a new international consensus on how to react to massive 
violations of human rights (ICISS, p. 9). The commission, comprised of experts from around 
the world including the Russian diplomat and politician Vladimir Lukin, published its report 
in 2001 posing a serious challenge to the absolutist understanding of sovereignty by redefining 
it as ‘responsibility.’ According to the report, first and foremost, the responsibility of the state 
was to protect its populations from mass atrocities. If the state was unable or unwilling to 
protect its citizens the ICISS report asserted that the responsibility would pass on to the 
international community. In this way, international coercive measures to be taken in order to 
protect populations from mass atrocities could not be interpreted as an intervention to a 
rightfully ‘sovereign entity’ since sovereignty becomes void with the failure to protect (Prat & 
Zamaris, 2015, pp. 139-142).  
 Referred to by Western states as an ‘emerging norm’ of international law (United 
Nations, 2004) the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect was adopted unanimously by heads of 
state and governments in the World Summit of 2005 meeting as the General Assembly of the 
United Nations. In comparison to the ICISS’s report, the doctrine of R2P was significantly 
narrowed down in the Outcome Document that also clarified some ambiguities in order to find 
an agreement with the sceptical non-Western world, specifically Russia. In this context, the 
Document determined that in order to use coercive means as a last resort in response to a 
particular case the UN Security Council authorization is mandatory, a provision that secured 
the Russian support as a permanent member of the council with veto power. Moreover, the 
document named four atrocity crimes that warranted the utilization of R2P: genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity narrowing down the scope of the 
doctrine. 
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As concluded in the Outline Document of 2005, R2P consists of three pillars. The first 
pillar affirms the responsibility of each sovereign state to protect its populations from mass 
atrocities. The second pillar acknowledges the responsibility of the international community in 
times of crisis to assist sovereign states in fulfilling their responsibility. The last and most 
controversial pillar deals with the proper international response in a case where a sovereign 
state through omission or commission ‘manifestly fails to fulfil its responsibility’ to protect 
their population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. If 
after all the peaceful means in accordance with the UN Charter’s Chapter VI and VIII are 
exhausted, the international community, through the Security Council, should be prepared to 
take collective action in accordance with Chapter VII (United Nations, 2005).  
R2P was subsequently endorsed by the UNSC Resolution 1674 (28 April 2006) with 
the support of all five Permanent Member States including Russia that affirmed the doctrine of 
R2P (Bellamy, Davies, & Glanville, 2010). Then, the question emerges as to why and when 
Russia has grown critical of the doctrine of R2P despite the fact that it had endorsed it in the 
UN General Assembly and Security Council. The answer to this question requires scrutinizing 
Russia’s evolving strategic culture in recent years as the ground for its changing position on 
such an international norm creation and its practices that appears clash with prevailing Russian 
strategic culture. 
 
Russian Strategic Culture 
Strategic culture brings identities, ideas, and narratives in theorizing about international 
politics. It is based on an assumption that states cannot be viewed as purely rational actors 
seeking to maximize interest, and that a cultural approach is needed to fully make sense of their 
behaviour in the realm of foreign and security affairs (Wendt, 1999; Snyder, 1977). Following 
this premise Gray approaches strategic culture as ‘modes of thought and action with respect to 
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force, which derives from the perception of the national historical experience, from aspirations 
in national terms and even from civic culture/way of life’ (1981, p. 35). Based on the perception 
of the self and the other, shared ideas, emotional responses and patterns of habitual behaviour 
acquired by a national strategic community lay the ground for the foundation of strategic 
culture (Snyder, 1977, p. 8). As such Johnston (1995, p. 46) broadly describes the concept as 
an ‘ideational milieu which limits behavioural choices’ of a state. Yet, more specifically, a 
strategic culture perspective primarily focuses on security issues paying special attention to the 
views about the use of force and threat perception to understand state’s behaviour presuming 
that a prevailing strategic culture constrains decision-makers, defines appropriate behaviour, 
and reflects insecurities (Meyer, 2006; Longhurst, 2004). In sum, strategic culture consists of 
a number of shared beliefs, perceptions, and ideas concerning the security environment as well 
as codes and attitudes, and patterns of behaviour towards the outside world in the form of 
responses to overcome threats and attain security.  
The dominant Russian strategic culture with a brief exception during the 1990s has had 
a strong expansionist, revisionist, conspiratorial and anti-Western orientation with a 
conservative and realist outlook (Lytvynenko, 2013; Kosmarskaya, 2011; Averre & Davies, 
2015). Its resultant characteristics is that of ‘an almost obsessive perception of a general threat 
towards Russian sovereignty and territorial integrity’ (Eitelhuber, 2009, p. 27). Such an angst 
towards the outside world leads to a ‘Russian logic of besieged fortress’ (Igumnova, 2011, p. 
264), famously elaborated by Alexander III that Russia had only two allies, its army and the 
navy, as well as in Lenin’s proclamation that ‘we are surrounded on all sides by enemies, and 
we have to advance almost constantly under their fire’ (Bathurst, 1981, p. 29). As mentioned 
by George Kennan in his famous X article’ (1947), Russia has been pronounced with a sense 
of perpetual vulnerability in the face of malicious foreign enemies and their internal 
collaborators (Ermath, 2006; Igumnova, 2011). Hence, the prevailing Russian security 
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perception that generates a general distrust for the external world is that Russia is ‘surrounded 
by domestic and foreign enemies with aims to erode the stability of the regime (…) 
undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russian Federation’ (Sinovets, 2016, 
p. 421). 
International relations are, thus, perceived to be a strictly zero-sum game between eternal 
rivals in which a political achievement of the West viewed as a threatening loss for Russia 
(Sinovets, 2016). Meanwhile, the view that ‘Russia can be an Empire, or it can be nothing’ 
(Morenkova-Perrier, 2014, p. 32) gives way to a division of the world into spheres of influences 
in which Russia is destined to enjoy hegemony in certain regions. In this regard, the ‘near 
abroad policy’ of Russia is exclusively based on the self-appointed idea that Russia has a 
legitimate sphere of influence within the post-Soviet territories due to its historical and cultural 
legacies (Antczak, 2018) which licenses the use of force against countries like Georgia and 
Ukraine seeking a pro-Western orientation (Morenkova-Perrier, 2014).  
In the construction of contemporary Russian strategic culture, the West as the ultimate 
and threatening other has played a salient role (Tichy, 2017;  Igumnova, 2011). Russian identity 
trying to come to terms with the West has deeply influenced its strategic culture of insecurity 
vis-à-vis the West (Tsygankov, 2019). The revival of Eurasianism as an ideological and 
civilization alternative (Papava, 2013) has been a response to its perceived vulnerability in the 
world, and toward the West in particular. Even though the genesis of Eurasianist thought dates 
back to the late 19th century, its influence on Russia had remained rather marginal until the last 
decade (Lewis, 2019). In the broadest sense, Eurasianism renouncing Western materialism and 
decadence dismisses a Western-inspired society and polity, and instead, advocates for the 
conservation of the Eurasian spirit inherited from the uniqueness of Russian history (Papava, 
2013). In rejecting the West, depicted as a capitalist, imperialist and soulless monolith, Russian 
Eurasianists are confident that Russia would be the order-setting country in the region, a view 
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perfectly illustrated by Sergey Alexandrovich Karaganov who claims that with the rise of 
Eurasianism Russia has switched ‘from being the periphery of Europe, (…) into the centre of 
Greater Eurasia’ (Quoted in Lewis, 2018, p. 1620). The impact of Eurasianism is also apparent 
in the views of Sergiy Lavrov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who in sharp contrast 
to his earlier views, argued in 2016 that the ‘Russian people possessed a cultural matrix of their 
own, an original type of spirituality and never merged with the West’ (Quoted in Pearce, 2018, 
p. 88).  
The president Vladimir Putin too, in his early years in power, did not view the West as 
an adversary and instead hoped to integrate with it. This is best demonstrated by Putin`s own 
remarks during his first years in office. Indeed, it was Putin who rejected to view NATO as an 
enemy (Laruelle, 2016) while affirming that ‘a course of integration with Europe will be one 
of the main directions of our foreign policy’ (Quoted in Bonnett, 2004, p. 59). Yet Putin`s 
consolidation of power in Russia, the eastward expansion of NATO and the EU towards post-
Soviet territories and lastly the independence of Kosovo and intervention in Libya galvanised 
Russian anti-Westernism to a degree where Kanet claims ‘the government decided that 
achieving security and foreign policy objectives on the basis of cooperation with the West was 
impossible’ (2019, p. 191-192). This stand has become discernible recently in Putin`s 
conservative/nationalist turn reflecting that the Russian feeling of encirclement has been 
galvanised, and thus its anti-Westernism (Laruelle, 2016; Kanet, 2019). As a Russian observer 
stated in relation to the US, ‘for the elites [in Russia] anti-Americanism is now as proper as 
wearing pants’ (quoted in Barry, 2009). 
All in all, these characteristics of Russian strategic culture has set an ideational milieu 
which guides its policy choices concerning Russian approach toward R2P, constrains decision 
makers by encouraging and discouraging particular policy paths, and defines appropriate 
behaviour.   
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Understanding the Russian Stance on R2P 
Between Consent and Contestation 
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Eastern communist bloc, 
Russia entered the last decade of the 20th century significantly weakened, struggling with 
internal turmoil and a general lack of confidence. In the immediate post-Cold War world era, 
dominated by the United States, Russia had little capacity and will to influence international 
developments settled to establish cordial relations with the Western world under the frail 
leadership of Boris Yeltsin. Hence, in a world torn apart by ethnic clashes, Russia was 
indifferent not only to the US assuming the role of a global police force but also towards the 
Western endeavour to legitimise military intervention for humanitarian purposes. The Russian 
attitude started to shift with the bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO forces in 1999 in reaction to 
the Kosovo crisis (Allison, 2013, p. 68). The military intervention had bypassed the Security 
Council, as it would have been vetoed by Russia. The Russians concluded from the Kosovo 
case that it shattered Russia’s traditional strategic influence in the Balkans as it appeared that 
it was not able to protect its allies from unilateral Western interventions. 
Russian scepticism towards humanitarian interventions of the West became more 
evident with Vladimir Putin`s rise to power in 2000 who had a vision to restore Russia`s great 
power status by pursuing a more aggressive foreign policy. The Russian Foreign Policy 
Concept of 2000 stressed that ‘humanitarian intervention’ and ‘limited sovereignty’ are 
unacceptable because they justify unilateral military action (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Russian Federation, 2000). Putin, in his first presidential speech in the State Duma in 2000 
referred to military operations by the Western powers as being ‘under the pretext of 
humanitarian intervention,’ while, in fact, violating the sovereign rights of states reminiscent 
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of the Cold War (Averre & Davies, 2015, pp. 817-818). Indeed, Russia under Putin was much 
more inclined to view Western-led humanitarian interventions as a calculated infringement of 
state sovereignty in the post-Cold War global turbulence.  
 The US-led invasion of Iraq, again with no Security Council approval yet partly 
justified by some arguments borrowed from the idea of humanitarian intervention, further 
demonstrated the relationship between humanitarianism and power politics as well as the 
former’s likelihood to be abused by powerful Western states (Allison, 2013). To counter 
Western unilateralism Russia came to emphasis on multilateralism and consensus within the 
UN Security Council. Yevgeniy Primakov, the former Prime Minister of Russia, summed up 
the Russian position with a simple formula: ‘rather the United Nations than US unilateralism,’ 
referring to Security Council where Russia commands a veto power (Primakov, 2004).  
Within this formula, the objection of Russia towards R2P was overcome during the 
2005 World Summit with two revisions in the original report. First, the use of coercive means 
was made conditional on a UN Security Council decision enabling Russia to exercise a veto 
power and deprive Western unilateralism of legality, if and when necessary. Second, the human 
rights violations requiring action were narrowed down to four mass atrocity crimes. As a result, 
Russia endorsed the doctrine of R2P at the 2005 World Summit which was followed by its 
approval of R2P in the UNSC Resolutions 1674 and 1894.  Russia’s confidence in its ability 
to prevent the interventionist tendencies of Western powers through the vetoing mechanism in 
the Security Council was the key that led to the initial Russian consent. However, it seemed 
that while Russia held the key to let the Pillar III mechanism to be practiced the likely evolution 
of R2P into an international norm with legal and moral strength has surpassed the Russian 
power. Even short of coercive means the increasing usage of R2P as an effective moral and 
political language has built an international legitimacy for the doctrine, a development that has 
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resurrected Russia’s concerns about national sovereignty and the non-intervention principle in 
a world in which Russia is believed to be surrounded by its enemies determined to weaken it. 
 
Countering and Contesting the West 
The Russian approach towards R2P is, at best, that of reservation and hesitation. Since it is 
generally regarded as a doctrine created by the Western powers who are likely to abuse it at 
the expense of Russia an immediate threat is perceived and a cautious ideational and strategical 
position is taken. The idea of countering the West adds an immediate security dimension to the 
conception of R2P bringing in strategic culture into the play.  
Russia is also troubled by a universalist interpretation of R2P by Western powers that 
are more inclined toward intervention, bypassing the Security Council (hence a Russian veto), 
focused on morality over the legality and more sensitive to humanitarian issues. Holding a 
conservative-realist view of the world, highlighting the supremacy of state sovereignty, 
underlying the need for stability instead of morally justified interventions except in the post-
Soviet territories the Russian position is thus shaped by caution and distrust towards the west. 
Russia principally agrees with the notion that sovereign states have a responsibility to 
protect their people from atrocity crimes as well as the need to protect vulnerable populations 
(Ziegler, 2016a, p. 82). But when it comes to the coercive element of R2P, that is collective 
international action to stop mass atrocities taken place in a foreign country, Russia turns 
reluctant raising questions of who is to intervene, when is to intervene, and how is to intervene 
as well as the motives and objectives of the intervention. All of these are legitimate concerns, 
yet reflect uneasiness of the Russians. Sergey Lavrov goes as far as asking the following 
question: ‘Who will determine whether or not mass violations are taking place?’ (The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2017). It seems that first and foremost Russia is 
preoccupied with the question of countering Western interventionism. Born out of the distrust 
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towards the western world and its own vulnerability at home Russia rallies for a more cautious 
interpretation of R2P, and also wants to keep subjecting the third pillar of R2P to its veto power.  
 
Defending Sovereignty, Resisting Norm Creation 
Russia advocates a world order based on respect for the sovereign equality of states and the 
principle of non-intervention. Hence, it categorically rejects the idea of ‘limited sovereignty’ 
and suggests that international peace and stability can best be preserved through the guidance 
of international law which emphasises sovereignty as a central principle (Permanent 
Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, 2012). Russia, pointing to the 
possibility that in an international order with ‘limited sovereignty’ the choice to employ 
military force will rest upon a small number of Western states (Ziegler, 2016a, p. 83) has, thus, 
been concerned that R2P is likely to be interpreted by Western powers as a licence to intervene 
in domestic affairs of weak states.  
Presentation of R2P as an emerging norm also disturbs Russia who prefers to use the 
word ‘concept’ or ‘notion’ while referring to R2P (Baranovsky & Mateiko, 2016, p. 50). In this 
line, opposing to Security Council`s attempt to refer R2P as an emerging norm Russian 
representatives to UN warns against ‘taking rash and hasty steps to apply that idea arbitrarily 
and (…) interpreting it too broadly’ (General Assembly Debate on Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect, 2009). This suggests that Russia is not in favour of putting R2P to a 
high status such as a new norm of international law reflecting Russia’s conservative and statist 
stance on emerging international norms (Averre & Davies, 2015, pp. 82-83). The manifestation 
of Russian conservatism in the face of a norm that is perceived constructed and championed 
by the West can be understood against the background of its strategic culture that views the 
West with wariness and distrust.  
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However, Russia does not want to appear objecting to the idea of saving vulnerable 
populations from mass atrocities, but it questions the need for crafting R2P as an international 
norm to respond to mass atrocities. According to Moscow, the appropriate legal and 
instrumental means to prevent mass violations of human rights already exist, at least in theory. 
Interpreting a humanitarian catastrophe as a threat to international peace and security, and, 
thus, authorizing the use of force by the Security Council is possible as it was practiced before, 
such as UNSCR 688 and 794. This ad hoc form of humanitarian responses to selected cases is 
a safe and preferred way of addressing humanitarian crises for Russia since it enables Russia 
to exert its influence on world politics and protects its allies with its veto power in the Security 
Council. Additionally, the Russians argue that the Geneva Convention on Genocide has already 
specified the responsibility of sovereign states to prevent such crimes. Thus, reflecting its 
conservatism in international norm building the Russian stand is that with the UNSC and the 
Genocide convention at hand there is no need for a new norm or legal mechanism which can 
be used selectively and/or misused unilaterally by western powers that will generate an 
increasing legitimisation of humanitarian intervention through a general consensus on the 
coercive means of R2P (Baranovsky & Mateiko, 2016, p. 52). Russians have grown 
apprehensive with the prospect of R2P transforming into a norm because, as Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed, ‘R2P was just another name for humanitarian intervention,’ 
a term that fell out of favour (quoted in Baranovsky & Mateiko, 2016, p. 51).  
Built on its strategic culture of insecurity and suspect of the West, Russia suggests that 
intervention based on humanitarian justifications would undermine global stability, and enable 
the West to intervene freely in the world at the expense of Russia (Ziegler, 2016a). Thus, Russia 
opts for the safety of national sovereignty and great-power politics, and feels comfortable 
without creating new norms that demand a global moral and political responsibility beyond 
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national boundaries that may play at the hands of the universalist and unilateralist Western 
powers.  
 
‘Sadder but Wiser:’ Learning from Libya and Syria  
The Libya intervention of 2011, sanctioned by a UN Security Council resolution from which 
Russia abstained, is considered to be the first ‘successful’ implementation of the Pillar III of 
the doctrine of R2P. Yet the Libya case provided the Russians with a catalyst to review their 
position on R2P in relation to their strategic culture. The implicit support Russia gave initially 
to the Western powers willing to intervene in Libya by invoking the R2P appeared confusing 
since, when the Libyan civil war erupted in February 2011 as part of the Arab Spring, it was 
expected that Russia would have opposed a humanitarian intervention and vetoed a possible 
Security Council resolution. However, Russia condemned the Gaddafi regime and voted in 
favour of Resolution 1970 which called for an arms embargo towards a regime accused of 
crimes against humanity. Later on, Russia did not block Resolution 1973 that authorised ‘all 
necessary measures’ to protect civilians. 
The reluctance of, then president, Medvedev to confront the US when the bilateral 
relations were in a period of ‘reset’ (Financial Times, 2011), Gaddafi`s apparent threats for 
mass atrocities to the opposition groups (ABC News, 2011), and the lack of immediate Russian 
geopolitical interests at stake in Libya are usually mentioned as explanations for this early 
cooperation of Moscow with the Western powers. However, the Western-Russian 
rapprochement on R2P was quite short-lived as Moscow, soon after the beginning of the 
operation, started to accuse the Western coalition of going far beyond the mandate of 
Resolution 1973, which was the protection of civilians, through arming the rebels and 
implementing a regime change. While Western states labelled the Libyan case as a ‘model’ for 
implementing R2P, the Russian position was that Resolution 1973 was a ‘scrap of paper to 
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cover up a pointless military operation’ (The Embassy of the Russian Federation to the UK, 
2011). In this context, Putin described the Russian disappointment with the over-reach in Libya 
as a ‘learning experience,’ a further demonstration that the West cannot be trusted when it 
comes to the use of force in the name of R2P (Ziegler, 2016b, p. 350). 
Russia was not only critical of the intent of interveners in Libya but also the outcome. 
Since any R2P action is expected to meet the criteria of a reasonable prospect for success 
Russian officials claimed that the NATO intervention failed in this respect too. In the absence 
of government control in the immediate aftermath of the intervention, the Russians constantly 
pointed out the chaos in Libya in terms of widespread torture, indiscriminate killings and gross 
human rights violations. Instability and turmoil fostered by foreign interventions were 
described by Sergey Lavrov:  
What we are seeing now only goes to show that regime change, especially through the use of force 
from outside, never leads to any good anywhere. Libya has turned into a territory without a central 
government, a country fragmented into districts controlled by different armed groups’ (quoted in 
Piskunova, 2018, p. 4).           
In sum, Libya served as a test case for the Russians to come to a conclusion about R2P’s likely 
usage by Western powers for their strategic gains disturbing regional peace and stability.
 This ‘learning experience’ of Russia in Libya soon had implications on another crisis 
in the Middle East.  After the fall of the Qaddafi regime in Libya, the Arab Spring spilled over 
Syria where it quickly turned into a bloody civil war with sectarian features. Western states 
with the lead of the US appeared interested in a regime change stimulated, if necessary, by 
intervention justified on humanitarian grounds. The Russians, ‘sadder but wiser’ as described 
by Putin after the Libya debacle, did not give in to the demands of Western powers (Putin, 
2012). Thus, emphasising the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria, Russia repeatedly 
vetoed the Western-sponsored resolutions invoking Chapter VII of the UN charter and calling 
for sanctions on Syria. Arguing that externally induced regime changes result in chaos and civil 
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wars Russia often justified its position on Syria by referring to the Libyan experience while 
also stating that intervention to Syria would merely strengthen the Islamic terrorist finding 
ground in Syria and further destabilizing the region. Moreover, pointing out the humanitarian 
catastrophe Saudi Arabia, a strategic ally of the West, created in Yemen, Russia accused the 
Western world of being highly selective in employing the doctrine of R2P, reserving it for the 
regimes that are hostile towards them (Ziegler, 2016b, p. 350). The Syria case demonstrates 
that Russia has integrated its approach to R2P into a broader context of security thinking with 
significant input from its strategic culture.  
 
Russian Exceptionalism  
Though Russia defends the idea of sovereign states` control over internal affairs, the non-
interference principle and territorial integrity of states, none of these principles were observed 
in any of the Russian military interventions in its environs. Instead, Dmitriy Medvedev, then 
the president of Russia, stated after the Georgian war that sovereignty does not mean a state 
has the right to do whatever it pleases (Ziegler, 2016b, p. 350), and President Putin after the 
annexation of Crimea called for the right to self-determination of the Crimean people to be 
respected (Borgen, 2015, pp. 236-237).  
Russia has repeatedly accused Western powers of taking advantage of humanitarian 
crises to further their interests and applying double standards in invoking R2P. However, when 
Russia perceives its geopolitical interests at stake, it doesn’t hesitate using political arguments 
similar to that of R2P to justify its military interventions. Russia viewed the Kosovo case as an 
unacceptable violation of international law that must not be repeated. Yet, the language used 
by the Russian politicians to justify their intervention in Georgia in 2008 (Allison, 2013, pp. 
156, 212), the Crimean annexation in 2014 and the ongoing Donbass war in Eastern Ukraine 
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Crimea were very similar to the arguments put forward by the Western coalition to excuse the 
NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (Kuhrt, 2015, p. 104). 
It was Medvedev who drew parallels between Kosovo and South Ossetia arguing that 
if the former was a sui generis case so was the latter (Ziegler, 2016a, p. 82). He accused Georgia 
of committing genocide towards the Ossetians, and Lavrov, the foreign minister, more recently 
accused Ukraine of conspiring to ethnic cleansing by exterminating Russians and Jews 
(Haaretz, 2018). While the Kremlin frequently uses, when it deems necessary, a discourse very 
similar to the language of R2P, it refrains from directly mentioning the concept in the Security 
Council or in any official document (Baranovsky & Mateiko, 2016, p. 63). When describing 
the Russian military operations abroad the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ or ‘R2P’ is not 
used either by the government or by the (government-controlled) media (Piskunova, 2018). 
Instead, Russia defends its position by referring to article 51 of the UN Charter, the right to 
self-defence (Evans, 2009). Russia also is careful to reserve this discourse only for fellow 
Russian compatriots living in the post-Soviet vicinities, where the Kremlin claims a legitimate 
sphere of interest and influence (Ziegler, 2016b, p. 357).  
Russian officials always warned Western powers against rash and incautious military 
actions while underlining military options must be considered only as a last resort. Yet, Russia 
showed no sign of caution or seeking a political solution to the dispute before the intervention 
in its region, and whether or not Russia used military force as a last resort is highly debatable. 
Similarly, Russia frequently stated that before implementing R2P’s third pillar, the failure of 
the government to protect its population must be manifestly demonstrated. Besides, it has 
always been the Russian stand that the use of force within R2P should acquire approval from 
the UNSC.  By avoiding a direct R2P terminology in the cases mentioned above Russia 
conducted military operations unilaterally without a UNSC approval, and did not bother to 
investigate whether the governments of Georgia and Ukraine committed mass atrocities when 
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it carried out direct and indirect military interventions justified, at least partly, on humanitarian 
grounds. The Russian strategic culture of prioritising security in its near abroad where 
establishing zone of influence is viewed legitimate seems to have prevailed over a principle 
stand on R2P. 
 
Conclusion 
According to the World Summit Outcome Document, responding to massive humanitarian 
crises through R2P includes, among other measures, a military component under a UN Security 
Council mandate. When it comes to the use of force, approving or disapproving it or taking 
part in it, states step into the realm of security even if the motive and objective may be 
humanitarian. In the realm of security thinking, states are influenced by their strategic culture 
that forms a loose code of conduct for policymakers, and a context within which security 
decisions are made. Russia is not an exception. The Russian strategic culture by constraining 
decision-makers, defining appropriate behaviour, and reflecting insecurities and aspirations has 
affected its contestation about R2P. 
As such, the Russian position on R2P is shaped by caution and distrust. Despite its 
uneasiness with the idea and practices of humanitarianism, Russia agreed with a notion of 
humanitarian responsibility to protect vulnerable populations from mass atrocity crimes. Yet, 
with the emergence of the doctrine of responsibility to protect, Russia stressed the differences 
between the principles of R2P which they agreed upon and the interventionist interpretation of 
R2P by the West which they strongly disagreed. Though the use of force under the doctrine of 
R2P requires Security Council authorization Russia with a veto power in the council is still 
concerned that gaining an international legal and moral strength R2P may be used for 
interventionist policies by western powers. Such a distrust of the West that arises from its 
strategic culture leads Russia positioning itself in the ‘sceptics group.’ In a similar line, with a 
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conservative reading of the UN Charter, Russia, in defence of the preservation of the 
established international order, denies R2P the status of an emerging norm concerned that 
adaption of R2P as a norm would result in weakening state sovereignty, undermining 
international law and enhancing the dominant position of the West with significant damages 
on Russian security stature in the globe. The resulting Russian approach towards R2P, which 
is generally regarded as an idea created by the West and for the Western interests, is that of 
reservation and hesitation.  
Such a Russian approach to R2P is linked to its strategic culture which views the 
external world, and especially the West and its norm-building efforts, threatening. From a 
Russian strategic culture perspective, R2P with its coercive element falls into the domain of 
security in which moral and humanitarian concerns do not play a decisive role. Instead, threat 
perception, sense of insecurity and vulnerabilities of Russia construe parameters for 
appropriate behaviour that is geared to attain security, overcome threats, and eliminate the 
source of insecurity. In this, the West is defined as the primary source of the threat, and western 
norm building efforts, like R2P, are viewed with suspicion.   
However, while Russia has been denouncing the interventionist inclinations of the 
Western world based on humanitarian concerns, it doesn’t hesitate to use military means 
justified by similar discourse when it is deemed furthering Russian national interests as was 
the case in the secession of South Ossetia and Crimea, and the war in Eastern Ukraine. Yet, 
Russia is careful not to use R2P as a formal justification for its military operations in its near 
abroad. Instead of invoking a universalist language of R2P, the Russian usage is specific only 
to be applied for the Russian compatriots in post-Soviet territories as in line with Russian 
foreign policy doctrine and its strategic culture that places an inherent claim on its near abroad. 
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